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In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak assumed office as British prime minister, he was the fifth UK leader to occupy the role over a six-year span.

Unleashed on the UK by Britain's EU exit, this signified unprecedented political turmoil. So how might we describe what is occurring in the French Republic, now on its sixth premier in 24 months – three of them in the last ten months?

The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for support from Socialist lawmakers as the price for his administration's continuation.

But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the scale of which it has not experienced for many years – perhaps not since the start of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.

Governing Without a Majority

Essential context: ever since Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, the nation has had a divided assembly separated into three opposing factions – left, the far right and his own centrist coalition – without any group holding a clear majority.

At the same time, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its national debt level and budget shortfall are now almost twice the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to approve a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In September, the leader named his trusted associate Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which proved to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from both supporters and rivals.

To such an extent that the next day, he stepped down. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in modern French history. In a dignified speech, he blamed political intransigence, saying “partisan attitudes” and “certain egos” would make his job virtually unworkable.

Another twist in the tale: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for two more days in a last-ditch effort to salvage cross-party backing – a task, to put it mildly, not without complications.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were early elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to avoid elections. The leader's team announced the president would appoint a new prime minister two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Would he endure – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already on board, the Socialists said they would not back no-confidence motions tabled against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those votes, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, however, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS explicitly warned that it would be demanding further compromises. “This,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, like the PS, the right-leaning parties are themselves split on dealing with the administration – some are still itching to topple it.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR seek his removal.

To succeed, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, finished.

Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the divided parliament musters collective will to approve a budget this year, the prospects for the government beyond that look grim.

So is there a way out? Early elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A fresh premier would face the same intractable arithmetic.

An alternative might be for Macron himself to step down. After winning the presidential election, his successor would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But this also remains unclear.

Surveys show the future president will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

In the end, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Numerous observers believe that cultural shift will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”